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Abstract:
Criticism of contract theory has always played an important role in Hartmut Kliemt’s
writings on political philosophy. Notwithstanding his objections to a consent-based justi-
ﬁcation of the state he has never subscribed to an anarchist position. In Hartmut Kliemt’s
view, a minimal state which protects the basic liberties of its citizens has to be considered
legitimate. The article begins with a brief restatement of the most inﬂuential objections
that have been raised against the various forms of contract theory. Thereafter interest-
based accounts of political legitimacy are critically examined; it is argued that individual
interests fail to provide a justiﬁcation for any kind of political authority. Finally, philo-
sophical anarchism is suggested as a possible alternative to contract theory and interest
theory. Although philosophical anarchism holds that no state has a moral right to ru-
le, it can be reconciled with the view that it is in the individual’s interest to create and
maintain a minimal state.
1. Introduction
Contract theory has, from the very beginning, played a prominent role in Hart-
mut Kliemt’s writings on political philosophy. Although he has persistently cri-
ticized contractual accounts he has not asserted that there is no justiﬁcation for
any exercise of political power. Quite to the contrary, he has always considered a
minimal state to be legitimate which protects the basic liberties of its citizens. In
the following I will dwell on two closely related questions suggested by this line
of reasoning. I will ask what the alternative to a contractual defense of the libe-
ral state is and what it would mean if one could not come up with any plausible
justiﬁcation.
I will begin, in the second section, with a brief restatement of the most im-
portant objections that have been raised against contract theory. Thereafter, in
the third section, I will critically examine interest-based accounts of political
legitimacy. I will argue that neither of the two theories succeeds in justifying
the authority of a liberal state. In the fourth section, I will explore ‘philosophi-
cal anarchism’ as an alternative way of imagining the relationship between the
individual and the state. In particular, I will consider to which extent a non-
revolutionary form of anarchism could be reconciled with a liberal position.274 Frank Dietrich
2. The Failure of Contract Theory
Contract theory in its various classic and modern forms is based on two moral
assumptions which are at the core of political liberalism. The individuals in the
state of nature who deliberate on the founding of a political community are de-
scribed as equal and free. The ﬁrst assumption, of course, is not meant to deny
that human beings differ with regard to their physical strength and intellectu-
al capacity. The individuals are considered to be equal in so far as nobody is
in a position of natural supremacy or subordination vis-à-vis the other. The se-
cond assumption refers to freedom in the political, not metaphysical, sense of
the word. Initially, individuals are not subject to any political authority, and any
restriction of their freedom has to meet their approval. According to the afore-
mentioned assumptions, the state is only entitled to wield political power if each
individual consents to its rule. The contract that is signed in the state of nature
speciﬁes the conditions under which the agents of the state can legitimately use
coercive force. However, the act of consent not only warrants the state’s use of
power but also creates political obligations for its subjects. By entering into the
contract, the individuals make a binding promise to obey the laws the sovereign
rightfully enacts.
With regard to the argument that is put forward in the next section it seems
important to distinguish between two aspects of contract theories. On the one
hand, contractual accounts explain the individuals’ willingness to leave the state
of nature and to accept restrictions of their freedom. They give reasons why
everybody may expect to beneﬁt from overcoming anarchy and entering into a
political society. Thereby they demonstrate that the individuals take a rational
decision when agreeing with the creation of a state. On the other hand, contract
theories aim at establishing a normative relationship between the state and its
citizens. They account for the state’s moral right to exercise political power and
for the moral obligation of the citizens to comply with the law. As will become
apparent when I discuss interest-based theories of political legitimacy, the mo-
tivational and normative features of the contract should not be conﬂated.
The key problem of contractual arguments pertains to the individual consent
on which the justiﬁcation of the state is based. The idea of a contract that is con-
cluded in the state of nature is purely ﬁctitious; there is no historical evidence
that any state has ever come into being through a voluntary agreement of its
subjects. Even if some states were founded by contract in the dim and distant
past, nothing would follow for their contemporary citizens. Since, according to
contract theory, consent is required of each individual personally, the decisions
of some remote forefathers cannot have any binding force.1 But the citizens of
contemporary states have not signed a contract, nor have they expressed in any
other explicit form their willingness to comply with the existing legal and politi-
1 In his Two Treatises of Government Locke stated: “[...] Whatever engagement or promise any one
has made for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot by nay compact whatsoever
bind his children or posterity. For his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the father [...].”
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cal institutions. Thus theorists who wish to stick to a contractual approach are
left with two alternatives: they can base their arguments either on tacit consent
or on hypothetical consent (Dietrich 2008, 60–65).
The tacit consent of a person is not expressed explicitly in spoken or written
word but has to be inferred from his or her behavior. The most famous instance of
a contractual argument that relies on tacit consent is to be found in John Locke’s
political philosophy. In Locke’s opinion, mere residence on the state’s territory
indicates that the individuals approve of the political authority.2 Provided that
the individuals are not forcefully prevented from leaving the country, they have
a choice between different political and possibly even anarchist communities. If
they voluntarily decide to remain in the state, they thereby tacitly consent to
the obligations that are connected with residence.
Against Locke’s justiﬁcation of political authority it has been objected that
residence on the state’s territory cannot be plausibly interpreted as a sign of
approval.3 First of all, it must be remembered that for many citizens emigration
involves considerable costs and risks. In other countries they may be confronted
with cultural barriers, such as a foreign language, and may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
make a living. Consequently, they may have strong reasons to stay in the state,
even if they do not agree with its exercise of political power.4 Moreover, one
important alternative that the tacit consent argument presupposes is no longer
available today. Contrary to the 17th century, when Locke developed his theory,
nowadays the territory of the earth is completely occupied by states. Therefore,
individuals who wish to realize their anarchist ideas cannot return to the state
of nature. They have to live in one state or the other, despite the fact that they
oppose any form of political authority (Kliemt 1980, 100).
This criticism notwithstanding, contract theorists can still maintain that the
argument is not fundamentally ﬂawed. They can assert that the state could
plausibly assume tacit consent if it satisﬁed a number of requirements. To begin
with, the state has to see to it that all its citizens, irrespective of their social
status, reach a certain standard of education. If its citizens acquired important
qualiﬁcations, such as language skills, emigration would become a realistic op-
2 Locke remarked: “[...] Every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the
dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to
obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; whether
this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether
it be barely traveling freely on the highway; and, in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of
anyone within the territories of that government.” (Locke 1970, §119, 366)
3 In addition, John Locke’s version of contract theory has been criticized for a number of other
reasons. For instance, it has been objected that a person’s act or omission can only count as tacit
consent if he or she is aware of the normative consequences. However, generally citizens do not
think that they undergo political obligations simply by remaining in the country where they were
born.
4 In his essay Of the Original Contract David Hume wrote: “Can we seriously say, that a poor
peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or
manners, and lives, from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires. We may as well assert
that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was
carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves
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tion for them. Furthermore, the state must guarantee the widest possible range
of exit rights, including the right to secede and the right to live in anarchy. Re-
garding the latter alternative, Harry Beran (1987, 59) proposed to set up a ‘dis-
senter’s territory’ where no political authority is exercised.5 Thus, each citizen
would be allowed to choose between the present state and other options—he or
she could apply for membership in other political communities, try to establish
an independent state, or decide to live in the state of nature. Even then, some
citizens might not be able to realize their political goals, e.g. other countries
might reject their request for immigration or not enough people might support
their separatist aspirations. It must be stressed, however, that the state has not
illegitimately conﬁned their range of options. All restrictions result from other
people’s exercise of their rights to political association and dissociation. There-
fore, all citizens enjoy the widest range of options that is compatible with the
equal rights of other people. If they remain in the state, it may be concluded
that they tacitly agree with its rule, not as the best of all conceivable options but
as the best of all available options. Consequently, tacit consent is a normatively
meaningful category and can in principle justify the exercise of political power.
However, at present all states fail to meet the aforementioned requirements and
cannot be regarded as legitimate.6
As an alternative to tacit consent, many proponents of contract theory have
focused on hypothetical consent. Their justiﬁcation for the right of states to wield
political power over their citizens shows a counterfactual structure. Political in-
stitutions are deemed legitimate if the individuals would have opted for them in
a ﬁctitious choice situation. Arguments referring to hypothetical consent are put
forward in two different versions that need to be carefully distinguished (Morris
1996, 219–221). On the one hand, there are contract theories that—following the
Hobbesian tradition—describe the choice situation in a rather realistic manner.
Accordingly, James Buchanan takes the natural distribution of power resulting
from the bodily strength and intellectual capabilities of the individuals as a star-
ting point for his argument (Buchanan 1975, 23–25). On the other hand, there
are contract theories that—following the Kantian tradition—specify the choice
situation in view of certain moral ideals. Most famously, John Rawls imagines a
decision behind a veil of ignorance that bars the individuals from all information
they could use to their advantage (Rawls 1971, 118–123).
The idea of a counterfactual contract has been persuasively criticized by
Hartmut Kliemt in many of his publications. First of all, he has raised a princi-
pled objection against the assumption that moral rights and obligations can be
5 Anarchists may protest against their conﬁnement to a ‘dissenter’s territory’ because they regard
all kinds of political borders that restrict their freedom of movement without their prior agree-
ment as illegitimate. In response to this objection, contract theorists may argue that all individu-
als have the right to establish a state and to exclude potentially dangerous persons, provided that
they leave ‘enough and as good’ territory for others.
6 Furthermore, contract theorists may argue that the decision not to leave the country may express
different degrees of consent. The more costly it is for an individual to emigrate, the less consent
he or she articulates by remaining in the state. This line of reasoning is persuasively criticized in
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created by hypothetical consent. As outlined above, a contract binds a person be-
cause he or she has voluntarily made a promise to perform or omit certain acts.
The obligation must, in other words, be self-imposed by a free person who could
have decided not to enter into the contract. Therefore, a ﬁctitious choice a person
would make under certain conditions cannot in reality bind him or her to comply
with the law. If arguments that rely on hypothetical consent have any normative
relevance at all, this must be so for reasons which are not aptly characterized as
contractual.
Over and above his principled rejection of hypothetical consent as a possi-
ble source of moral rights and obligations, Hartmut Kliemt has raised strong
objections against the Rawlsian type of argument. As he has convincingly de-
monstrated in a number of articles, decisions which are taken behind a veil of
ignorance could justify highly questionable practices. For instance, if the indi-
viduals are ignorant of their present physical condition and their future health
prospects, they would agree to mandatory kidney donation (Kliemt 1998). Li-
ving with one kidney usually does not cause serious problems, whereas being
dependent on renal dialysis signiﬁcantly reduces the quality of life. Thus, ra-
tional individuals should try to ensure that they have at least one functioning
kidney and can evade permanent medical treatment. An institution of compul-
sory organ sharing could guarantee that nobody has to undergo renal dialysis.
Whenever both kidneys of a person fail and cadaveric organs are not available,
he or she would receive one kidney from a fellow citizen. If nobody were pre-
pared to offer a suitable organ on a voluntary basis, the state would randomly
select a ‘donator’ and enforce the transplantation. Since the individuals behind
the ‘veil of ignorance’ could expect to beneﬁt from mandatory kidney donation,
they would agree to this practice.7
A state which organizes the forceful extraction of organs from citizens rejec-
ting the ‘donation’ evidently violates fundamental liberal principles. More spe-
ciﬁcally, such an institution, as Hartmut Kliemt has emphasized, would fail to
respect the ‘separateness of persons’. Consequently, the same objection that John
Rawls has raised against utilitarian accounts applies to his own version of con-
tract theory. Since the individuals in a ﬁctitious choice situation cannot withhold
their (hypothetical) consent, they are deprived of their veto power. Contrary to
factual contracts, their most basic rights, such as the right of bodily integrity,
can be trespassed without their prior agreement. According to Hartmut Kliemt,
contract theories of the Rawlsian type must be seen as potentially dangerous
from a liberal point of view. They can be used to justify coercive state practices
to which some, or even many, citizens do not agree. Thus, reference to terms
like ‘hypothetical consent’ or ‘acceptability’ may serve as a camouﬂage for the
absence of ‘real consent’ or ‘acceptance’ (Kliemt 2003).
7 The argument takes yet other aspects, such as the age of a potential receiver and his or her
responsibility for the organ failure, into consideration. However, to understand the critique of
contract theories which refer to the hypothetical consent of the citizens it may sufﬁce to explain
the basic idea of the institution.278 Frank Dietrich
3. Individual Interests and Normative Claims
In the above section I have argued that tacit consent—in contrast to hypotheti-
cal consent—may in principle serve as a basis for political rights and obligations.
However, only states which meet very high demands are justiﬁed in interpreting
the residence of their citizens as a sign of tacit consent. At present, no govern-
ment can rightfully claim that the individuals living on its territory tacitly agree
to its rule. Even modern democracies, which grant their citizens fundamental li-
berties and a general franchise, do not meet the aforementioned requirements.
As I have already stated in my introductory remarks, Hartmut Kliemt has not
been led by his critique of contract theory to join the anarchist camp. Quite to
the contrary, he has maintained that living in a state that conforms to liberal
principles is the best we can hope for. According to Hartmut Kliemt, it is in the
individuals’ interest to establish and preserve a liberal state that protects their
lives, bodily integrity, and property. In his view, even a minimum welfare state
that respects the principle of equality before the law has to be regarded as le-
gitimate (Kliemt 1993, 167–170).8 In the following, however, I will not discuss
normative reasons for and against redistributive schemes of a certain type; in-
stead I will raise the more fundamental question whether any justiﬁcation for
the exercise of political power can be derived from individual interests.
To begin with, the assertion that it is in the interest of each individual to
live in a liberal (or minimum welfare) state allows for different interpretations.
We commonly use the expression ‘in the interest of’ to point out that something
is better for a person than other options. Thus, to gain a full understanding of
the phrase we have to know to which alternatives it, i.e. the object or state of
affairs that is said to be in someone’s interest, is compared. As we have seen,
contract theories take the state of nature as a benchmark and argue that the
individuals have strong reasons to establish political institutions. One problem
with this kind of comparison is that we do not have much empirical knowledge
on the risks that stateless societies entail.9 Not surprisingly, the accounts of the
state of nature the proponents of classical and modern contract theories have
given differ considerably. Some theorists, such as Thomas Hobbes, have made
rather pessimistic assumptions about human nature, whereas others, such as
John Locke, have painted a less gloomy picture. Depending on how negative or
positive the state of nature is portrayed, a more or less extending class of states
appears to be justiﬁed (Kliemt 1980, 29).
8 In an article on the justiﬁcation of welfare states Hartmut Kliemt pointed out: “[...] A classical
liberal political economist who wants to live in a free western society seems bound to accept that
founding a kind of welfare state is (normatively) legitimate.” (Kliemt 1993, 160)
9 In Solidarität in Freiheit Hartmut Kliemt argued that in view of our historical experience the
introduction of a state has to be considered to be more dangerous than the maintenance of an-
archy. However, in the state of nature individuals cannot effectively protect themselves against
the combined forces of others who will most likely form a political organization. Thus, overcoming
anarchy may be said to be in the individuals’ interest because it is the only way to encounter the
threats that the creation of states by others pose to them (Kliemt 1995, 21–23).Individual Interest and Political Legitimacy 279
Against the contractual approach one may object that the state of nature does
not provide us with an adequate standard of comparison. If one wishes to justify
a particular state or type of state, it seems more appropriate to weigh its relative
advantages against other states or types of states. However, no state can plau-
sibly claim to promote the interests of each of its citizens better than any other
existing, let alone conceivable, state. Evidently, some individuals always stand
to gain from a change of the political or economic institutions of the state. For
instance, members of a territorially concentrated minority would beneﬁt from a
devolution of power to local authorities, and economically less successful people
would beneﬁt from a more comprehensive welfare system. Contract theories and
interest theories appear to face similar problems: the former cannot prove that
any state meets with the unanimous approval of its citizens; the latter cannot
demonstrate that any state is in everyone’s best interest.
Moreover, contract theories give an explanation for the creation of moral
rights and obligations that is, at least, theoretically persuasive, whereas it is
difﬁcult to see how the moral right to wield political power and the moral ob-
ligation to comply with the law can arise from individual interests. Here it is
important to recall the distinction between the motivational and the normative
aspects of contractual accounts which I have brieﬂy explained in the last secti-
on. According to contract theories, it is from everyone’s perspective rational to
overcome the state of nature and to establish a political community. Thus, each
individual is assumed to have an interest in the creation of a state which moti-
vates him or her to agree to the contract. However, moral rights and obligations
do not come into existence until the prospective citizens have actually signed the
contract. Interests can provide strong motives for an individual to grant other
persons’ moral rights and to undertake moral obligations. But taken as such,
interests are neither capable of conferring moral rights nor of imposing moral
obligations on anybody. Consequently, if one wishes to justify a normative relati-
onship between the state and its citizens, it does not sufﬁce to demonstrate that
the latter stand to beneﬁt from the services of the former. One still has to explain
how the government’s right to use coercive force and the individual’s obligation
to comply with the law has been established.10
The relationship between interest, consent and obligation, as it is described
in contract theory, has a ﬁrm basis in our moral intuitions. In everyday life we
take it for granted that our interests give us prudential, not normative, reasons
for a certain course of action. One may, for instance, have a strong incentive to
buy a car because the ability to travel around is a prerequisite for getting a bet-
ter paid job. Yet the fact that it would be in one’s interest to own a car does not
mean that one is morally obliged to acquire it. Given the opportunity to obtain a
higher income, the decision not to buy a car may be imprudent, but it certainly
deserves no moral criticism. Even more evidently, nobody has a moral right to
sell his or her car because another person can be expected to beneﬁt from owing
10 For the argument that we only can expect others to respect our interests if we are prepared to
respect their interests see Hoerster 1987.280 Frank Dietrich
it. Until both parties have reached agreement and actually signed a contract,
no moral rights and obligations have been created.
From the perspective of economic theory, my argument against an interest-
based justiﬁcation of moral norms may appear to be mistaken. Supporters of
this approach hold a non-cognitivist position in metaethics, i.e. they do not be-
lieve in objective values, moral truth and the like.11 They consider categorical
imperatives on which moral theories traditionally have focused to be incompa-
tible with non-cognitivism. In their view, moral argument has to conﬁne itself
to hypothetical imperatives of the kind ‘if you wish that X, than do Y’. Hypo-
thetical imperatives can be understood as prudential rules which recommend a
course of action that will most likely lead to a desired end. Thus, the distincti-
on between prudential and normative reasons which I have presupposed in my
argument appears to be mistaken. From an economic point of view, there is sim-
ply no alternative to an interest-based justiﬁcation of moral norms. It would go
beyond the scope of this article to discuss the economic approach to morality in
any detail. In the remainder of this section I will merely examine if individuals
actually have an interest in supporting the liberal state.
Individuals evidently have prudential reasons to obey the law insofar as they
wish to avoid punishment. Fear of legal sanctions, such as imprisonment, or so-
cial sanctions, such as exclusion, may often prevent citizens from breaking the
law. Their interest in the maintenance of a liberal state, however, does not pro-
vide the individuals with a reason to comply with its law. Although citizens may
have a reason to wish that a liberal state exists, they may have no reason to
act in accordance with its law. In modern states, which usually consist of many
million people, single acts of disobedience do not have any discernible effects.
Most obviously, the state will still be able to fulﬁll its basic functions if one ci-
tizen or a small group of citizens does not respect the law. Only the cumulative
effects of many acts of disobedience may lead to the breakdown of public order.
However, for two reasons rational individuals deliberating on whether to comply
with the law do not need to take this scenario into account. Firstly, a person’s
own disobedience will not prompt (many) other people to violate legal norms;
if a critical level of non-compliance will be reached this does not depend on his
or her decision.12 Secondly, it is highly unlikely that the behavior of this par-
ticular person will tip the balance and make the maintenance of public order
impossible. Hence, prudential reasons to comply with the law only result from
the state’s ability to deter its citizens from acts of disobedience. It is irrelevant
11 In Hartmut Kliemt’s words: “Im Rahmen der normativen Ökonomik lassen sich grundsätzlich
alle Fragen der non-kognitivistischen Ethik behandeln. Insoweit kann der ökonomische Imperia-
lismus zur Eroberung auch des traditionellen Territoriums der Ethik ansetzen und Moralrecht-
fertigungen auf gegebene Interessen stützen.” (Kliemt 1997, 157)
12 When Socrates in the Crito dialogue (Plato 1971) reﬂected on the consequences of his disobedience,
he was in a somewhat different position. He could for two reasons more plausibly assume that his
escape from prison would pose a serious threat to the legal order. Firstly, contrary to most modern
states, Athens was a small city state which comprised only some thousand citizens, and, secondly,
Socrates attracted many young adherents who might have followed his example.Individual Interest and Political Legitimacy 281
if the existence of a particular (type of) state can be said to be in the individuals’
interest, i.e. to be preferable to other (types of) states or the state of nature.
Of course, as a matter of fact many individuals may hold the opinion that
it is in their interest to live in a liberal state. This conviction may be the re-
ason why they feel obliged to support the state and to comply with its law.13
Moreover, many citizens of democratic states may approve of the decision proce-
dures by which legal norms are created. In pluralist societies, majority decisions
may appear as the only way to deal fairly with the high number of conﬂicting
views. As a consequence, citizens may feel bound to respect each law the parlia-
ment enacts, irrespective of their own preferences (Baurmann and Kliemt 1990,
25–27). If we wish to maintain a democratic state we evidently have strong pru-
dential reasons to promote these feelings in our compatriots. It is in our interest
that as many people as possible voluntarily support the state and obey its laws
even if the risk of detection is low. However, if my argument has been correct,
an interest-based justiﬁcation of political authority does not stand up to critical
examination. Neither a moral obligation nor a prudential reason to obey the law
does result from the fact that it is in the individuals’ interest to live in a libe-
ral state. Thus, the propagation of interest theory appears to be vulnerable to
the same objection that has been raised against hypothetical contract theory. By
pointing to the advantages of a liberal state one may try to camouﬂage that its
exercise of power lacks theoretical justiﬁcation.
4. Philosophical Anarchism
In the last section I have examined interest theories as a possible alternative
to contractual accounts of political legitimacy. I have tried to demonstrate that
interest-based arguments can neither justify the moral right to wield political
power nor the moral obligation to obey the law. This leaves me with two see-
mingly conﬂicting views which have to be integrated into a coherent theoretical
framework. On the one hand, there is reason to believe that a liberal state which
protects its citizens against aggression and respects their basic liberties is the
best one can hope for. On the other hand, even a liberal state cannot justiﬁably
claim to have a moral right to rule that is grounded either in individual con-
sent or in individual interest. In the remainder of this paper I will explore a
theoretical standpoint which seems to be capable of reconciling both views.
In a number of publications, John Simmons has defended an anarchist po-
sition which can be characterized by two distinctive features. His theory may
13 See the following statement: “Sicher ist, dass einige der am tiefsten verwurzelten Überzeugungen
unseres aufgeklärten Alltagsverstandes uns die nahezu unumstößliche Vermutung nahe legen,
auf den Staat um eines lebenswerten Lebens willen nicht verzichten zu können. Zu dieser Auffas-
sung wird bei näherer Überlegung nahezu jeder einzelne je für sich gelangen. Insgesamt scheint
sich daraus eine egoistische Rechtfertigung des Staates als einer im Interesse jedes Einzelnen
liegenden Institution zu ergeben. So kommt jeder zu dem Schluss, dass es für ihn [...] notwendig
ist, unter einer Zwangsordnung zu leben, und im Sinne dieser ‘Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit’ lebt
er sogar freiwillig unter einer Zwangsordnung.” (Kliemt 1980, 27)282 Frank Dietrich
be labeled as a posteriori anarchism (in contrast to a priori anarchism) and
as philosophical anarchism (in contrast to political anarchism). As to the ﬁrst
distinction, supporters of a priori anarchism hold that for principle reasons no
state whatsoever can be morally legitimate. Robert Paul Wolff, for instance, has
argued that an autonomous moral agent cannot accept an obligation to obey
the commands of any political authority. In his view, autonomous persons are
ultimately responsible for their actions (or omissions) and cannot allow others
to decide what they must do (or not do). Hence, any state’s putative right to
command, irrespective of its theoretical justiﬁcation, is not compatible with the
moral autonomy of competent persons.14 Conversely, adherents of a posterio-
ri anarchism, such as John Simmons, concede that states may in principle be
morally entitled to wield political power. They usually agree with contract theo-
rists in so far as they consider states which actually receive the assent of every
single citizen to be legitimate. They believe, however, that at present no state
can rightfully assert to meet with the unanimous approval of its subjects. Mo-
reover, they regard it as highly unlikely, although not conceptually impossible,
that in the foreseeable future any legitimate state will come into existence.15
The distinction between political anarchism and philosophical anarchism is
even more important for an adequate understanding of Simmons’ position. Sup-
porters of both theories share the view that, for principled or contingent reasons,
all existing states are lacking moral legitimacy. What distinguishes political an-
archists from philosophical anarchists is their determination to put an end to
the state’s unjustiﬁed use of coercive force. They believe that the realization of a
stateless society is a viable option which is in everyone’s interest. Thus, in prac-
tical terms political anarchism makes on citizens the demand to actively oppose
the state and to disrespect its legal norms. Only for strategic reasons individu-
als may occasionally comply with the law but they may not accept the state on a
permanent basis (Rothbard 1983, 183–188).
Philosophical anarchists, in contrast, are primarily concerned with the illegi-
timacy of the state on the level of theory. John Simmons, for instance, has been
led to his position by examining the most inﬂuential accounts of political obliga-
tion, such as contractual, utilitarian or fairness-based arguments. His defense
of anarchism has been motivated by the inability to come up with a plausible
justiﬁcation for the moral obligation to obey the law (Simmons 1979, 191–195).
14 As Wolff puts it: “The deﬁning mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary
obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. It would seem then, that there can be no
resolution of the conﬂict between the autonomy of the individual and the putative authority of the
state. Insofar as a man fulﬁls his obligation to make himself the author of his decisions, he will
resist the state’s claim to have authority over him.” (Wolff 1970, 18)
15 In John Simmons’ words: “A posteriori anarchism [...] maintains that while all existing states
are illegitimate, this is not because it is impossible for there to be a legitimate state. Nothing
in the deﬁnition of the state precludes its legitimacy; rather, existing states are condemned as
illegitimate by virtue of their contingent characters. [...] Most a posteriori anarchists [...] are not
very optimistic about soon realizing their ideals (if they defend any), nor are their ideals very
close to any existing modern political society.” (Simmons 2001, 105–106)Individual Interest and Political Legitimacy 283
Philosophical anarchists, however, do not think that the denial of a moral right
to rule and a moral obligation to obey has necessarily practical implications.
“[They] hold that there may be good moral reasons not to oppose
or to disrupt at least some kinds of illegitimate states, reasons that
outweigh any right or obligation of opposition. The practical stan-
ce with respect to the state, the philosophical anarchist maintains,
should be one of careful consideration and thoughtful weighing of all
of the reasons that bear on action in a particular set of political cir-
cumstances. The illegitimacy of a state (and the absence of binding
political obligations that it entails) is just one moral factor among
many bearing on how persons in that state should (or are permitted
to) act.” (Simmons 2001, 109)
Thus, philosophical anarchists may take the view that one should not aim at
overcoming a state which respects basic liberal principles. They may doubt that
a stateless society would be capable of adeaquately protecting the physical in-
tegrity and property of its members. They need not—and in many instances do
not—believe that the realization of an anarchist community would be in everyo-
ne’s interest. Subsequently, philosophical anarchists may maintain that under
realistic assumptions a liberal state is preferable to any other option. Of course,
although Simmons’ position allows for combining the two views which I have
outlined above, its practical implications need to be spelled out in more detail.
Evidently, persons who sympathize with philosophical anarchism will have a
critical attitude toward any kind of state activity. If this theory strongly inﬂu-
enced public opinion it would, on the one hand, counter a tendency which gives
liberal thinkers cause for concern. Faced with wide spread skepticism toward its
legitimacy, the state would ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to expand its competences and
to encroach on individual liberties. On the other hand, one may wonder whether
a liberal state could persist if many of its citizens subscribed to philosophical
anarchism. It might be impossible to uphold public order if too many people
thought to be under no moral obligation to obey the law.
To begin with, we have to ask whether we can expect ordinary citizens to
obey the rules of a state which they consider to be illegitimate. In the absence
of binding political obligations, as Simmons put it, they can have three different
reasons to conform to the law. Firstly, as I have already mentioned in the last
section, individuals normally wish to avoid punishment. Fear of legal or social
sanctions provides them with a prudential reason for refraining from violations
of the law. Secondly, the citizens may feel morally obliged to comply with certain
laws even though they do not believe to owe obedience to the state. They may, for
instance, be willing to respect a law that forbids the killing of innocent people
because they regard it as morally wrong to commit murder. Thirdly, individu-
als may identify with a state which they deem preferable to any other political
system or the state of nature. Hence, a philosophical anarchist may be prepared284 Frank Dietrich
to do his or her ‘share’ for the stability of the state on the condition that other
citizens cooperate as well.16
Neither of the aforementioned reasons on its own can guarantee perfect com-
pliance with the law. Sometimes the risk of detection (or the level of punishment)
is simply not high enough to deter people from acts of disobedience. Moral rea-
sons merely apply to a restricted number of legal norms; they cannot motivate
the individuals to comply with laws which are lacking any moral quality, such
as tax regulations or trafﬁc rules. Some people may not identify with the libe-
ral state and may not be willing to respect its law on a voluntary basis. These
problems notwithstanding, the three reasons together can possibly ensure a suf-
ﬁcient degree of law-abidingness. Thus, it is conceivable that a liberal state can
persist even if most of its citizens do not believe to owe obedience to its legal
commands.
Furthermore, we must consider if state ofﬁcials who subscribe to philosophi-
cal anarchism can be expected to enforce the law. (If they were not willing to
sanction norm violations, citizens would have no prudential reasons to refrain
from acts of disobedience.) An ofﬁcial’s interest in the maintenance of a liberal
state does not provide him or her with a prudential reason to enforce the law.
The individual behavior of any ofﬁcial has no discernible effect on the capacity
of the state to deter potential law-breakers. Therefore, even ofﬁcials who prefer
a liberal state to all other options have no incentive to support the legal system.
State ofﬁcials have, of course, a prudential reason to avoid punishment for their
neglect of duty. But they only have to fear penalty if some superiors are willing
to supervise their activities and to impose sanctions on them. Since the motiva-
tion of the superiors to enforce legal norms needs to be explained as well, the
initial problem comes up again. The superiors (or the superiors of the superiors,
etc.) must have other reasons to fulﬁll their duties than fear of punishment.
State ofﬁcials who adhere to philosophical anarchism may, however, identify
with a political system that is based on liberal principles. As ordinary citizens,
they may be willing to support the legal order of a liberal state despite the lack of
prudential reasons. Even more important, state ofﬁcials have, from the perspec-
tive of consent theory, a moral obligation to do their job. Contrary to ordinary
citizens who have not entered into a normative relationship with the state, ofﬁ-
cials have signed a labor contract. They have made a binding promise to fulﬁll
their tasks and are, therefore, under a moral obligation to enforce the law. Of
course, it is difﬁcult to predict whether a sufﬁciently high number of ofﬁcials
will actually be prepared to fulﬁll their obligations. It is, however, by no means
absurd to think that a liberal state whose ofﬁcials subscribe to philosophical
anarchism might prove to be stable.
16 Fairness considerations obviously play an important role for the third reason. However, contrary
to fairness theorists, such as Hart 1955, Rawls 1964 or Klosko 1992, the philosophical anarchist
does not accept an obligation to obey the law. In the anarchist’s view, compliance to the law is a
‘voluntary act’ that neither the state nor other citizens can rightfully demand.Individual Interest and Political Legitimacy 285
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